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John Marshall’s long game
by Marc M. Arkin
A review of John Marshall: The Man Who Made the Supreme Court by Richard Brookhiser
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Richard Brookhiser
John Marshall: The Man Who Made the Supreme Court
Basic Books, 336 pages, $30.00

“I

t is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . . A law
repugnant to the Constitution is void.” With this ringing statement, recently appointed Chief
Justice John Marshall (1801–35), laid down his marker. It was not so much the principle of judicial
review that was novel—federal courts had considered the constitutionality of federal and state laws
before—but the force with which it was expressed and the institutional agenda it portended.
The case itself, Marbury v. Madison (1803), concerned the unpromising topic of judicial commissions.
In its waning hours, the Adams administration had sought to pack the bench with Federalist
supporters through a mass signing of judicial commissions. (Indeed, Marshall himself had been the
beneficiary of similar Federalist largesse; he was appointed by President Adams and confirmed by
the Senate shortly after the Republican electoral victory in 1800.) Some of the commissions went
undelivered in the confusion during the night before Jefferson’s inauguration. The new
administration refused to deliver them. One would-be recipient, William Marbury, sued. He
demanded his commission as a justice of the peace and sought a writ of mandamus (a court order)
from the Supreme Court directing Secretary of State James Madison to produce the document.

Obviously, the case was one of “peculiar delicacy,” as Marshall put it, a showdown between two
branches of the young government heightened by the fact that Marshall and Jefferson were cousins
and famously loathed one another.
In his resolution, Marshall set forth the template for many of his future decisions. His ruling for a
unanimous Court held that even though William Marbury was entitled to his appointment, and even
though the law might afford him a remedy after the incoming administration failed to make good on
that appointment, nonetheless the Supreme Court was not the place to start the legal ball rolling. As a
court primarily of appellate jurisdiction, the Constitution tied its hands—just as it constrained the
activities of the other two branches. While staking out the principle—the Supreme Court defines its
own constitutional powers—Marshall deftly avoided direct confrontation with the hostile Jefferson
administration.
It is a commonplace of legal history that an air of triviality hung over the Supreme Court in the early
years of the Republic. Its first three chief justices departed in short order; the third was actually a
recess appointment never confirmed by the Senate. The six justices comprising the Court were absent
from Washington for long periods, whether on diplomatic missions or, until 1801, riding appellate
circuits that covered hundreds of miles of bad roads and worse inns. In Washington, the Court met in
dismal quarters: a cramped committee room of the Capitol Building, underneath the House chamber,
a space described by its architect as “meanly furnished, very inconvenient.”
Marshall’s own appointment illustrated the Court’s orphan status. President Adams originally
offered the job to John Jay, the Governor of New York, who had served as the first chief justice. Jay
declined a second stab at the job, explaining pointedly that the federal judiciary was “lacking in
energy, weight, and dignity.” In the process of delivering Jay’s letter of refusal, then–Secretary of
State Marshall suddenly found himself with the nomination.
It fell to Marshall to mold the Supreme Court into the institution we recognize.

It fell to Marshall to mold the Supreme Court into the institution we recognize. In doing so, he was
blessed by a long tenure (with thirty-four years in the post, he is still the longest-serving chief justice);
a stable Court whose personnel did not change at all from 1812 to 1823; an institutional vision that led
to such innovations as the Court issuing a single authoritative opinion rather than continuing the
English practice of each judge offering his opinion seriatim; and, of course, his own superb legal
mind. It did not hurt that Marshall was also blessed with a convivial nature, unflagging courtesy, and
a fondness for providing his fellow justices—for many years they all boarded together when the
Court was in session—with the best red wine that the merchants of Washington had to offer. As the
story goes, the Court drank only on rainy days, and so, before dinner, Marshall would delegate the
junior-most justice, Joseph Story, to look out the window; if he reported clear weather, Marshall
would pronounce that it must be raining somewhere in the world and commence pouring.

R

ichard Brookhiser, a political journalist and superb popular biographer with expertise in the
founding era, focuses his new biography, John Marshall: The Man Who Made the Supreme
Court, on the Chief Justice’s public career and its effects. He tells the story primarily through a
chronological account of the Marshall Court’s most significant decisions, cases that mark the
curriculum of a first-year law school course in American constitutional law to this day. The reader
watches the Court grapple with its own role in defining the constitutional order, the relationship
between the three branches of the federal government and the limits of their respective powers, and
the relationship between the states and between the state and federal governments. Family, friends,
associates, even Marshall’s early life and his previous career in government, figure in the story
primarily as background to his career on the Court.
For each lawsuit, Brookhiser provides a thumbnail sketch of the underlying dispute and the parties,
as well as the Court’s resolution, and, for many of the cases, a brief account of what happened to the
parties after their day in court was over. Brookhiser’s eye for the telling anecdote is particularly
valuable as he sets the scene and explains the issues at stake. What emerges is a vivid picture of the
early nineteenth century’s freewheeling economy, ethically challenged local governments, and a legal
profession that thought nothing of someone serving as attorney general while representing private
clients.
Consider, for example, an effort by the New Hampshire state legislature to take over Dartmouth
College—and thereby change its institutional orientation from Federalist to Republican. The effort
was rebuffed in a decision based on the Constitution’s clause that forbade states from “impair[ing]
the Obligation of Contracts,” a term that the Court construed to include colonial-era college charters.
Famously, the case also featured a star turn by Daniel Webster in defense of his alma mater, “a small
college.” The New York State legislature’s grant of a monopoly on Hudson River steamboats to
Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston (a cousin of sitting Justice Livingston) was rejected with an
affirmation of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce without state interference; this, even

as the decision formally hinged on the challenger’s federal coasting license, which empowered its
ships to navigate all American ports and preempted inconsistent state law under the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause. State efforts to tax the Bank of the United States fell in a decision that first upheld
the constitutionality of the bank as within the federal government’s necessary and proper “sphere of
action” and then denied state power to tax the Bank given the “supremacy” of the federal
government, noting, in a line still known to every law student, “The power to tax is the power to
destroy.”

G

iven the book’s many pleasures, it seems only fair to point out some of its limitations. Rather
surprisingly, given Marshall’s towering prestige in the legal community, Brookhiser offers a
less than enthusiastic appraisal of Marshall, both as a man and as a jurist, a stance seemingly driven
by Brookhiser’s own skepticism about the Court’s place in contemporary America, a point he
mentions but fails to develop fully. Although conceding that Marshall gave the Court a dignity it had
previously lacked, Brookhiser depicts him as an essentially backward-looking figure whose pivotal
moment of inspiration came during his Revolutionary War service under George Washington and
whose Federalist principles were set in stone by his participation in the struggle to ratify the
Constitution—playing what Brookhiser uncharitably terms “a small but worthy role” in both events.
As Brookhiser concludes, Marshall came to fear that the Federalist legacy of the framing generation
was under attack, and so, in Brookhiser’s words, “this simple, lax, deeply serious man did his best to
defend it.”

Brookhiser’s depiction of
Marshall as a dinosaur stranded in
the age of mammals seems
overdrawn.

Brookhiser seems to have some difficulty pinning down the legal methodology Marshall used to
mount his rearguard defense of Federalism, and in his efforts to do so he imports twenty-first-century
categories of constitutional interpretation into the nineteenth century. For example, in Ogden v.
Saunders (1827), a case that held that the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the power to pass
bankruptcy laws did not preempt state bankruptcy laws, Marshall opined in dissent that “The
intention of . . . the [Constitution] must prevail . . . this intention must be collected from its words . . .
its words are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used.” This leads Brookhiser
to characterize Marshall’s approach as “literalism.” In other contexts he calls it “textualism,” the
position associated with the late Justice Antonin Scalia. At other times, when Marshall relies on the
historical context in which constitutional provisions were adopted to illuminate their
meaning—something he knew firsthand from the Virginia Ratifying Convention, to which he was a
delegate—Brookhiser describes him as embracing “originalism.” Perhaps it would be more apt to
treat Marshall as a (result-driven) eclecticist, who used whatever legal tool came to hand. The debates
that shape today’s canons of constitutional interpretation were not the debates of Marshall’s
generation, and our carefully constructed interpretive categories were not theirs.
Indeed, Brookhiser’s depiction of Marshall as a dinosaur stranded in the age of mammals seems
overdrawn. Like many historians, Brookhiser seems to conflate the visionary Federalists of the
framing with the quarrelsome political party that collapsed in the wake of the French Revolution and
the War of 1812. To this reader at least, it is not clear that Marshall’s vision was all that backwardlooking. His belief that the Constitution empowered a vigorous national government with a strong
unified economy at the expense of the states—essentially a Hamiltonian perspective—hardly seems
retrograde when compared with the neo-agrarian policies of the Jeffersonians or the reactionary
populism of the Jacksonians. Marshall’s view that the “people” came together in the state ratifying
conventions to create the federal government—a position that Brookhiser calls “populism”—is
arguably more forward-looking than the belief that the federal government resulted from a
“compact” between states, a position that ultimately justified secession and undergirded the
Confederacy. As to racial policies—and there is much in the book about Marshall’s failure to come to
proper terms with the peculiar institution, even to the point of being a substantial slaveholder
himself—at least Marshall’s Court ruled against the Cherokee removal policies of the Jackson
administration (on the basis of the treaties signed by the Cherokees with the federal government) and
avoided the ignominy of the Dred Scott decision of the succeeding Taney Court.

F

inally, lawyers may bridle at Brookhiser’s characterization of Marshall as “simple,” given that he
raised the Court to equal status with the other branches of government and that his vision of the
relationship between the federal and state governments, as well as of the relationship among the
federal executive, legislature, and judiciary still largely holds sway in our country. Although
Brookhiser drily admits that he has “even less legal training than Marshall” (who, on a furlough from
the Revolutionary Army, had attended a single course under the great George Wythe before hanging

out his shingle after the war), he suggests that as a non-specialist he may be able to see “legalisms
afresh.” Yet there are limitations to this approach. Among the “blots on Marshall’s record,”
Brookhiser cites Marshall’s characteristic technique of advancing a sweeping principle, then drawing
back to rest the decision on a lesser point—as he did in Marbury. Disappointing as this might be to a
layperson, most lawyers would see this as part of Marshall’s legal craftsmanship. Advancing a strong
position in dictum (a legal assertion not essential to the judgment) inflects the legal landscape and
leaves the point available for adoption on a future day while the court achieves its result on more
currently conventional grounds. Perhaps this is a “blot,” but it is also a fundamental technique of
judicial decision-making. It is also evidence of what may be called “playing a long game,” which, in
the course of his long and productive life, is exactly what John Marshall did.
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